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FOREWORD
In the final edition of Volume 20, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review proudly presents our annual Symposium issue. This year, the
Symposium focuses on issues facing both mentally and physically dis-
abled individuals. Five selections, authored by experts in the field of dis-
ability law, explore methods by which disabled persons can secure rights
granted them by federal and state constitutions and statutes. Each Arti-
cle is uniquely crafted to provide advocates with fresh ideas for employ-
ing legal instrumentalities to eradicate barriers facing their disabled
clients.
The Symposium commences with a comprehensive study authored
by Professor Michael Perlin. In his Article, Professor Perlin suggests
that "the notion of wide-ranging institutional and procedural reform in
Federal Court cases involving the mentally disabled" is no longer an idea
with "'good currency.'" Professor Perlin analyzes alternative forums
and sources for new causes of action for the mentally disabled. After
examining the historical background of state constitutional develop-
ments, methodologies employed in construing state constitutional provi-
sions and their role as a source of rights for the mentally disabled,
Professor Perlin contends that the importance of state constitutions in
securing rights for the disabled will continue to grow. While state statu-
tory provisions, including state statutory bills of rights for the institution-
alized mentally disabled, have received relatively little attention, state
courts appear willing to interpret state statutory rights more broadly
than required by the federal Constitution. Since it is unlikely that the
current Supreme Court will be favorably disposed to expanding the
rights of the mentally disabled, Professor Perlin concludes that "the use
of state constitutions and state statutes in state courts may be the last
frontier for the mentally disabled."
In their Article discussing confinement of the mentally disabled,
Steven Schwartz and Cathy Costanzo criticize the involuntary commu-
nity treatment proposal as being neither conceptually correct nor practi-
cally feasible. The authors first trace legal justifications for civilly
restraining people labelled mentally ill, then apply a least restrictive al-
ternative analysis to determine whether coerced community care meets
this constitutional standard. After examining current statutory and judi-
cial state law concerning such community treatment programs, the au-
thors identify several obstacles to their implementation. The authors
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suggest that in areas where community mental health services are pro-
vided responsively, adequately and voluntarily (as exemplified in western
Massachusetts), schemes for compelling treatment are both superfluous
and potentially harmful. Although community treatment proposals are a
beneficent attempt to improve conditions for mentally disabled individu-
als, the authors conclude that ultimately, it will only detract from their
present struggle.
The third Article in our Symposium, authored by Attorneys Marc
Charmatz and Sarah Geer, presents a cogent analysis of section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Congress designed section 504 to protect
disabled individuals from discrimination in "any program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance." The statute is applied in a variety of
contexts, including employment, education, health, welfare and social
services. Courts hearing claims by disabled plaintiffs face a critical issue
regarding the definition of the terms "program or activity." Under a
broad construction of those terms, all parts of an institution, such as a
college or university, would be subject to section 504 if any one part re-
ceived federal funds for any purpose. Conversely, recent United States
Supreme Court decisions interpret those terms narrowly, requiring iden-
tification of the specific program that actually received federal funds
prior to imposing any civil rights obligations. Thus, if a disabled person's
civil rights are violated by a subunit of an institution, section 504 is not
triggered when the particular subunit received federal funds directly or
benefits indirectly from federal funds given to the institution. Although
the Court has restricted its scope, the authors illustrate how section 504
still remains a viable remedy for a substantial number of handicapped
individuals suffering discrimination.
Also analyzing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the next Arti-
cle considers whether federally assisted programs can evade their duty to
provide disabled individuals "meaningful access." In "The Scope of the
Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under
Disability Civil Rights Law," Attorney Anthony Cook examines this is-
sue and concludes that while the duty is not absolute, any cost of compli-
ance with section 504 cannot outweigh the disabled individual's right to
meaningful access. His thoughtful piece includes a discussion of School
Board v. Arline, the United States Supreme Court's most recent decision
concerning section 504. To reach his conclusion, the author examines
the voluminous legislative history of section 504, administrative agencies'
regulations promulgated on the statute, and other judicial interpretation
of this imposed duty.
Our Symposium concludes with an essay in which Professor Jan
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Costello and Attorney James Preis analyze the landmark United States
Supreme Court decision of Youngberg v. Romeo, arguing that the federal
Constitution remains an important source of the right of mentally dis-
abled persons to community-based treatment. Professor Costello and
Mr. Preis demonstrate how their theory of such a right both builds upon
and may be distinguished from the earlier doctrine of right to treatment
"in the least restrictive alternative." The authors critically analyze post-
Youngberg decisions, finding in them support for their position that men-
tally disabled persons who are, or have been inappropriately confined, are
entitled to the treatment services which will enable them to exercise their
liberty in the community and avoid future hospitalization. Finally, the
authors posit extending the right to mentally disabled persons who have
never been confined in an institution, but whose liberty is restricted by
the state in other ways.
Following the Symposium, issue four also includes two student au-
thored selections and a Book Review. The first student Comment dis-
cusses a controversial area of California defamation law. In Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., a plurality of the United States Supreme Court em-
braced the idea that to encourage robust debate on those public issues
which lie at the core of the first amendment, any mass media reports
concerning issues of public or general interest should be protected by the
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan actual malice rule. Although the Rosen-
bloom doctrine was abandoned by the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., the doctrine still retains vitality in some state jurisdictions. In Cali-
fornia, one court of appeal has concluded that the Rosenbloom doctrine
is alive and well in this state and emanates from section 47(3) of the
California Civil Code. Conversely, another court of appeal has con-
cluded that section 47(3) is not nearly so broad, and only serves to codify
a limited qualified privilege for interested communicators to share infor-
mation among themselves. Now, after five years of conflict in the appel-
late courts, the California Supreme Court, in the pending case of Van
Nuys Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, has elected to determine just how
much, if at all, section 47(3) protects press reports on matters of public
concern. The author concludes that for public policy reasons, the
supreme court should hold that section 47(3) does embody Rosenbloom's
public interest privilege.
Our second Comment discusses the need for proposed congressional
amendment of federal copyright law to augment current computer
software protection. The author explores the problem of software piracy
and examines whether existing protections, including licensing and em-
bedded codes, are adequate. The Comment suggests that piracy has cre-
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ated economic disincentives for research and development of software-a
result contrary to the intention of the Copyright Act. The author con-
cludes that because present protection is inadequate, new legislation
scheduled for introduction in the United States Congress should be
adopted.
The fourth issue concludes with a critical review of Lenore Weitz-
man's book, The Divorce Revolution. The author of the book review,
Attorney Stanley Tobin, rejects Ms. Weitzman's calls for radical changes
in divorce laws. In her book, Ms. Weitzman documents what she consid-
ers to be the disasterous effect of no-fault divorce laws on women's eco-
nomic status. Weitzman argues that additional forms of property, such
as a spouse's future earning potential, should be included in the property
divided at divorce. This, Ms. Weitzman postulates, will help remedy the
inequities that currently favor men in divorce settlements. Mr. Tobin
criticizes the substance of Ms. Weitzman's proposals and questions the
data from which they are derived. Mr. Tobin asserts that Ms. Weitz-
man's proposals, if adopted, would have counterproductive results, in-
cluding discouraging marriage.
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